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STATEMENT OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
Petitioner seeks review of the Industrial Commission of Utah's 
order denying Petitioner's Motion for Review dated July 26, 1993. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant 
to §§ 35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86, 63-46b-16, and 78-2a-3, Utah Code 
Ann. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the Industrial Commission of Utah erred in 
finding no causation between Claimant's surgery on July 27, 1989 
and an industrial accident on September 15, 1982? The standard of 
appellate review: this Court will not change a factual finding 
unless it is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in 
light of the whole record before the Court. Utah Code Ann. § 63-
46b-16(4)(g) (1989); Tasters, Ltd. v. Dep't of Employment Sec. 819 
P.2d 361 (Utah App. 1991); Willardson v. Industrial Commfnr 856 
P.2d 371 (Utah App. 1993). 
2. Whether the Industrial Commission erred in finding that 
Applicant's 1988 injuries were the result of unusual and 
extraordinary exertion in moving heavy objects? The standard of 
appellate review: this Court will not change a factual finding 
unless it is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in 
light of the whole record before the Court. Utah Code Ann. § 63-
1 
46b-16(4)(g); Tasters, Ltd, v. Pep'* of Employment Sec. 819 P.2d 
361; Willardson v. Industrial Comm'nr 856 P.2d 371. 
3. Whether there was any material doubt respecting the 
Claimant's right to compensation? The standard of appellate 
review: this Court will not change a factual finding unless it is 
not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the 
whole record before the Court. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g); 
Tasters. Ltd. v, Dep't of Employment Sec,f 819 P.2d 361; Willardson 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 856 P.2d 371. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES. RULES. AND REGULATIONS 
None. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Claimant injured his back in an industrial accident on 
September 15, 1982 while employed by R.P. Scherer Corporation. (R. 
at 1 and 96.) Back surgery was performed by Dr. Kirkpatrick a 
short time later in 1982. (R. at 2, 5, and 96.) Claimant suffered 
a back strain in an industrial accident on June 11, 1985 while 
employed by Salt Lake County. (R. at 1 and 96.) 
Applicant filed claims before the Industrial Commission of 
Utah for the back injuries, a medical panel was convened, and the 
panel's determination that Claimant had a 15% permanent impairment 
of from the 1982 injury was adopted by the Commission. The 1987 
medical panel found no evidence of a herniated disc. The 
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Commission further found that Applicant was medically stable as of 
June 11, 1986. (R. at 1, 96, and 101.) 
Claimant was diagnosed with a low threshold for back pain from 
lumbar strain, nervous tension, and obesity. (R. at 101.) 
Claimant knew the probability of further back injury from moving 
heavy objects because his 1982 industrial injury occurred while 
moving heavy items. (R. at 101.) 
During 1988, the Applicant suffered back pain after lifting 
boxes for his mother and the pain continued until a more "serious 
episode of painH after he was cleaning his yard. (R. at 206-207 
and 209.) 
On July 21, 1988, Claimant was moving a concrete block of the 
type used as barriers in parking lots while cleaning up his yard. 
Applicant had a bar under the cement barrier and, with his two 
sons, "scooted it over out of the way so he could use his parking 
space." Claimant noticed that his back "started hurting pretty 
bad" and went to the hospital emergency room. (R. at 6, 208-209, 
and 264.) 
The Applicant's first examination after the July 21 accident 
was the next day at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center on July 22, 
1988. (R. at 6 and 264.) The Emergency Center physician, Dr. 
Keith Hooker, reported that Claimant "has had no pain in the last 
several months, maybe up to a year and a half." (R. at 6 and 264.) 
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Dr. Hooker explained that Applicant was injured when "[h]e was 
lifting a cement slab for somebody yesterday and now has pain down 
the left hip, lumbosacral area and the buttock. Doesn't really 
truly radiate as it did when he had his disc, he states." (R. at 6 
and 264.) Dr. Hooker examined Claimant for back pain on or about 
July 28 and August 1, 1988. Dr. Hooker was suspicious of 
Applicant's use of Percodan and referred him for a CT scan. (R. at 
5.) 
On August 2, 1988, Dr. Charles Smith first examined Applicant 
and reported that Claimant's "present episode occurred while 
cleaning up around his apartment doing some furniture moving, etc." 
(R. at 11 and 265.) Dr. Smith ordered a CT scan of the lumbar 
spine which was performed at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center 
and showed a bulging disc and focal herniated disc at L5-S1. (R. 
at 10, 11, 15, 260, and 266.) In the next examination on August 9, 
1988, Dr. Smith described Claimant's medical history in more 
detail: 
A CT scan done in 1985 revealed a bulging disc but no evidence 
of focal herniation. His present herniation occurred while 
apparently working around the house, pushing or pulling, no 
significant lifting. It appeared to be secondary to the 
activities of associated daily living. The patient pushed one 
piece of cement out of the way in conjunction with several. 
other people. 
(R. at 10 and 263.) 
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In a letter dated October 14, 1988s from Dr. Smith to the 
Division of Health Care Financing, Dr. Smith stated that "having 
reviewed the patient's history, this appears to be secondary to the 
original problem!,]M but a "second opinion referral of the patient 
will be made....M (R. at 9 and 251.) 
On October 26, 1988, Claimant was examined by Dr. Creig 
MacArthur for a second opinion concerning Applicant's low back and 
left leg pain. (R. at 248.) Dr. MacArthur stated that Applicant 
had Hdone reasonably well until just recently, more particularly in 
July when, about the 26th, he had a recurrence of his symptoms 
subsequent to a moving-type of injury when he was moving heavy 
objects about." (R. at 248.) 
Dr. Smith's pre-operatlve report entitled History and Physical 
stated that Applicant did "reasonably well in the interval" after 
his 1982 surgery "until 1988 in July when he was doing a lot of 
moving of boxes and so on when they were moving from one site to 
another. The combination of lifting and twisting with repetitive 
bending apparently was the underlying cause for the problem." (R. 
at 245.) 
Applicant's second back surgery was performed by Dr. Smith on 
July 27, 1989. (R. at 2, 246-247, and 273.) Following the 1989 
surgery, Dr. Smith concluded that Claimant had a 14% rating for the 
permanent impairment to Applicant's back. (R. at 2 and 3.) 
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Neither party requested a medical panel and Applicant 
expressly disavowed a panel claiming that none was required- (R. 
at 97 and 99-) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. The 1988 injuries were not the natural result of the 
compensable primary injury, since the causative chain between the 
original and subsequent injuries was broken by Applicant's exertion 
lifting boxes and cement barriers. The progression of a back 
injury remains compensable as long as the worsening is not shown to 
have been produced by an independent, nonindustrial cause. Unlike 
instances where a sneeze or picking up a four month-old baby were 
not conduct that constituted an independent, intervening cause, all 
Applicant's physicians reported that Claimant did reasonably well 
for a long period of time before he was injured while moving heavy 
objects in 1988. 
II. The ALJ and Commission found that Applicant's efforts in 
lifting boxes and concrete barriers were not common, day-to-day, 
and ordinary activities. Claimant's exertion was found to be 
unusual and extraordinary to distinguish the authority which 
provides that the causation between an original injury and later 
medical complications may be broken by an employee's independent, 
intervening conduct. 
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111. Applicant was paid all available workers9 compensation 
benefits following the 1982 industrial injury. Claimant argues 
that reasonable doubt respecting Claimantvs right to compensation 
for the injury should be resolved in his favort However, this rule 
of construction is inapplicable to an attempt to reopen a claim and 
recover additional benefits for a subsequent nonindustrial injury. 
Applicant alleges that there are doubts respecting Applicant's 
right to compensation, but these doubts are based on speculation 
and inadmissable evidence. 
ARGUMENT I 
NO CREDIBLE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT CLAIMANT'S 
1989 SURGERY WAS THE DIRECT AND NATURAL 
RESULT OF THE ORIGINAL 1982 INDUSTRIAL INJURY 
The direct cause of Applicant's 1988 injury was the exertion 
of lifting boxes and a cement parking barrier the day before 
Claimant was examined at the emergency room. The emergency room 
physician, Dr. Hooker, reported that a day earlier Claimant had 
lifted a cement slab resulting in back pain and that the patient 
had not experienced back pain for as long as 1% years before the 
examination. This is consistent with the medical evidence that 
Applicant was stable by 1986. More than six years elapsed from the 
time of the 1982 back surgery, caused by a compensable industrial 
injury at R.P. Scherer, and the nonindustrial injuries while 
lifting heavy objects during 1988. 
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In Mountain States Casing Servs. v. McKeanr 706 P.2d 601 (Utah 
1985), the claimant's arm was severed and reattached after an 
industrial accident. The injured worker's hand sensations had 
grown back gradually-and he was advised to continue to use his hand 
to restore use. The applicant sought payment of medical expenses 
for subsequent treatment of burns on his hand resulting from use in 
daily activities. Payment of medical expenses was denied on the 
grounds that the burns were unrelated to the original accident. 
The court held that H[a] subsequent injury is compensable if it is 
found to be a natural result of a compensable primary injury." Id. 
at 602. In particular, the court explained that the injured worker 
was "not required to show that his original tragedy was the sole 
cause of a subsequent injury, but only that the initial work-
related accident was a contributing cause of his subsequent hand 
injury." Id. (citations omitted). The court concluded that the 
burns to the worker's hand were a natural consequence of his 
industrial injury, since "the chain of causation between the first 
and second injuries" was not broken by his activities. Id. at 602-
03. 
in intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. Board of Review, 839 
P.2d 841 (Utah App. 1992), the court relied on the holding in 
McKean and other authority for a more precise definition of the 
"compensability test." Claimant injured her back while lifting at 
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work. Two years later, Applicant attempted to lift her four month-
old grandchild from a baby walker when she suffered another back 
injury that required surgery. Applicant filed a claim for medical 
and disability benefits and a medical panel was convened by the 
Industrial Commission. The Commission adopted the determination of 
the panel that the surgery was 70% the result of the industrial 
injury and 30% the result of the incident lifting the grandchild. 
The court noted that the ALJ relied on the medical conclusion of 
the panel and then applied the "compensability test" described by 
Professor Larson in his treatise. "The applicable test includes an 
analysis of the facts surrounding the subsequent injury and an 
analysis of the connection between the subsequent injury and the 
original compensable industrial injury. Id. (relying on 1 Larson, 
Workmenfs Compensation Law, § 13.11(a) (1992)). The court 
characterized that ALJfs application of the compensability test as 
the determination of a factual circumstance surrounding an 
industrial injury that must be ruled on by the ALJ. Id. 
Professor Larson distinguishes the causation rules for primary 
injuries and for the range of compensable consequences from the 
original injury. The causation rules for primary injuries are the 
standard issues of legal and medical causation: whether the Injury 
arose out of or in the course of employment and was a result of 
exertion during work-related activity. Allen v. Industrial Comm'n. 
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729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). However, "when the question is whether 
compensability should be extended to a subsequent injury or 
aggravation related in some way to the primary injury, the rules 
that come into play are essentially based upon the concepts <&*-
'direct and natural results,9 and of claimant's own conduct as an 
independent intervening cause." 1 Larson, §13.11 at 3-154. 
Claimant argues that the threshold issue is proof of legal and 
medical causation. By contrast, Utah case law and the leading 
commentator describe the differing causation rules for the range of 
compensable consequences from a primary injury, especially medical 
complications following an initial injury. In this claim, there is 
absolutely no dispute that the Applicant's exertion while moving 
heavy objects in 1988 was nonindustrial and did not arise in the 
course of employment or occur during work-related exertion. 
The direct and natural results rule involves two broad classes 
of claims. First, are cases where "an initial medical condition 
itself progresses into complications more serious than the original 
injury; the added complications are of course compensable." 1 
Larson, § 13.11(a) at 3-155. The second group of medical-causation 
claims are those where an independent medical condition is 
exacerbated by a compensable injury. The present claim is 
contained in the former classification and Professor Larson 
specifically discusses back injuries. In particular, "once the 
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work-connected character of any injury, such as a back injury, has 
been established, the subsequent progression of that condition 
remains compensable so long as the worsening is not shown to have 
been produced by an independent, nonindustrial cause." 1 Larson, § 
13.11(a) at 3-156. Indeed, the paradigmatic case described by 
Professor Larson is Perchelli v. Industrial Commfnr 25 Utah 2d 58, 
475 P.2d 835 (1970). 
In Perchelli and in the present appeal, the claimant suffered 
a back injury while engaged in nonemployment activities. The 
difference between this claim and Perchelli is that the claimant in 
Perchelli was hardly engaged in any exertion at the time of the 
subsequent injury, since the applicant was at home on a Sunday 
morning combing his hair when he sneezed and herniated a disc. The 
medical testimony was that the original back injury would have 
eventually required surgery regardless of the exertion. Thus, the 
court reversed the decision of the Commission that the sneeze was 
the independent cause of the applicant's disability and Professor 
Larson characterizes this result as "clearly correct.H 1 Larson § 
13.11(a) at 3-158. Professor Larson concluded as follows: 
The presence of the sneezing incident should not obscure 
the true nature cf the case, which is nothing more than 
that of a further medical complication flowing from a 
compensable injury. If the herniation had occurred while 
claimant was asleep in bed, his characterization as a 
mere sequel to the compensable injury would have seemed 
obvious. The case should be no different if the 
triggering episode is some non-employment exertion like 
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raising a window or hanging up a suit, so long as it is 
clear that the real operative factor is the progression 
of the compensable injury, associated with an exertion 
that in itself would not be unreasonable in the 
circumstances. 
§ 13.11(a) at 3-158. 
The primary issue on this appeal is whether Claimant's 
original, compensable back injury directly and naturally progressed 
for six years into a more serious injury that required surgery in 
1989. This dispute was resolved by the Commission under the range 
of compensable consequences causation rules, not the primary 
causation rules. 
The overwhelming evidence from the three physicians shows that 
the 1988 nonindustrial injuries were not caused by the 1982 
industrial accident. Applicant argues that selected portions of 
the medical records suggest that Claimant's own conduct was not the 
independent intervening cause of the 1988 nonindustrial injury. 
However, "[t]he ALJ has a responsibility to resolve factual 
conflicts." Willarflson v, Industrial Comm'n, 856 P.2d at 375 
(citing Lancaster v. Gilbert Pev,, 736 P.2d 237 (Utah 1987)). 
Moreover, this supposed factual dispute concerning whether 
Claimant's 1988 back injuries were caused by the direct progression 
of the industrial injury six years earlier is unsupported by the 
medical records. 
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In 1988, Dr. Hooker was the first physician to treat Applicant 
following the nonlndustrlal accidents. Dr. Hooker reported that a 
day earlier Claimant had lifted a cement slab and now had back 
pain. Dr. Hooker noted that Applicant had not had back pain for as 
long as 1% years. Dr. Hooker examined Applicant three times and 
referred the patient for a CT scan. The CT scan showed a bulging 
and a focal herniated disc in the lumbosacral spine. The prior CT 
scan before the 1988 nonlndustrlal accidents only showed a bulging 
disc in the lumbosacral spine. 
Dr. Smith next treated Claimant and likewise reported that he 
had done reasonably well until the 1988 injuries. Dr. Smith had 
several versions of the cause of Applicant's herniation. 
Initially, the injury was described as the result of cleaning up 
the house and moving furniture. Next, the back pain followed work 
around the house and pushing or pulling a piece of cement with 
several other people. Last, moving a lot of boxes and the 
combination of lifting and twisting with repetitive bending was 
said to be the underlying cause of the herniation. Dr. Smith 
referred Claimant to Dr. MacArthur for a second opinion. 
Similarly, Dr. MacArthur reported that Applicant had done well 
until July 1988 when back pain reoccurred after Claimant had been 
moving heavy objects about. 
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There is no dispute among the three physicians that Applicant 
was largely pain-free for several years before the 1988 lifting 
accidents, the industrial injury was six years before the 1988 
accidents, there was no herniation during the si& .years prior to 
1988, there was no medical treatment for back pain for many years 
before 1988, and Claimant sought emergency medical care the day 
after moving a concrete barrier. The lack of medical care before 
1988 is more significant where Applicant had a diagnosed low 
threshold for back pain from lumbar strain, nervous tension and 
obesity. These facts are sufficient to support the findings of the 
ALJ and Commission that the 1988 injuries and surgery were not the 
direct and natural consequence of the 1982 industrial injury. 
The ALJ and Commission found Applicant's testimony 
inconsistent concerning the exertion that preceded the 1988 
injuries. Specifically, Claimant claimed he was very careful when 
lifting boxes and minimized the amount of effort used to move the 
concrete parking barrier. Claimant knew the probability of a 
herniation if he lifted heavy objects, especially where he had a 
substantial permanent impairment to his lumbosacral spine from the 
1982 injury* The ALJ found that physicians must rely on patients 
for an accurate history and all three doctors reported that 
Applicant was injured while moving heavy objects. Moreover, the 
most reliable report of the accident from the patient would be the 
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history taken closest to the day of the injuries. The emergency 
room doctor noted that Claimant had injured his back lifting a 
cement slab one day earlier. 
Therefore, there is no credible evidence that Applicant's 1988 
back injuries were the direct and natural result of the original 
1982 compensable industrial injury. 
ARGUMENT II 
CLAIMANT'S 1988 INJURIES WERE THE RESULT OF HIS OWN 
INDEPENDENT, INTERVENING CONDUCT IN LIFTING HEAVY OBJECTS 
Applicant argues that the Commission erroneously concluded 
that the exertion necessary to move the concrete parking barrier 
was unusual and extraordinary within the meaning of Allen v. 
Industrial Comm'n, However, the findings by the ALJ and Commission 
that Claimant's efforts to move heavy objects in 1988 were unusual 
and extraordinary met the direct and natural results test of 
Mountain States Casing Servs, v. McKean, not the legal-cause 
requirement for the primary injury in 1982. In the findings of 
fact, the ALJ explicitly distinguished the Intermountain Health 
£a££ opinion from this claim, since lifting boxes and concrete 
barriers were not common, day-to-day, and ordinary. Specifically, 
the ALJ found that in I.H.C. the subsequent nonindustrial injury 
occurred during a common and ordinary activity, since lifting a 
four month-old baby out of a walker should not have required 
extraordinary effort. Conversely, Applicant's activities lifting 
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boxes and moving concrete barriers were held to require unusual and 
extraordinary exertion. In particular, the factual findings were 
that concrete barriers are heavy, difficult to move, and the mere 
fact that three family members were required to move the concrete 
block left little doubt that it was not an object that could be 
moved with moderate effort. The ALJ noted that the records of Drs. 
Smith and MacArthur showed Claimant did reasonably well until the 
strenuous exertion of lifting in 1988 reinjured his lumbosacral 
spine. 
The ALJ and Commission ruled that the causative chain between 
the 1982 surgery and the 1988 herniation cannot be broken by 
ordinary, nonstrenuous, day-to-day activities. The direct and 
natural results doctrine provides that the causation between an 
original injury and later medical complications is broken by an 
employee's independent, intervening conduct. The I.H.C. and 
Perchelli cases and Professor Larson agree that intentional or 
negligent conduct by a claimant will break the chain of causation. 
In this claim, Applicant had a permanent impairment caused by 
a lifting injury and was well aware of the probability of reinjury 
from lifting heavy objects. Claimant's 1988 injuries were not the 
result of a natural progression that became symptomatic after 
sneezing or attempting to pick up a four month-old baby. In 1988, 
Claimant knowingly and willingly exceeded the physical limitations 
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inherent in a 15% permanent impairment of the low back by activity 
which was unusual and extraordinary. 
Applicant claims that the terms "unusual and extraordinary" 
used by the Commission do not refer to exertion, but only mean that 
few of us ever attempt to move a concrete barrier. In addition, 
Claimant asserts that there is no evidence in the record as to the 
weight of the concrete block. However, Applicant's failure to 
offer testimony at the hearing to describe the weight of the 
parking barrier does not entitle Claimant to argue on appeal that 
he was engaged in normal activities or did not exceed his physical 
restrictions. Applicant must prove his claim by a preponderance of 
medical evidence. Willardson v. Industrial CQmm'n, 856 P.2d at 
376. Finally, the allegation by counsel for the Applicant that he 
was able to move a parking barrier in his office parking was not 
offered at the hearing, where it would have been inadmissible, and 
is improper argument on appeal. 
Therefore, the finding by the ALJ and Commission that 
Claimant's knowing and intentional efforts to lift boxes and move 
parking blocks required uncommon and extraordinary exertion was 
supported by the evidence. Applicant's lifting and moving of boxes 
and barriers was unusual and extraordinarily strenuous activity 
which broke the chain of causation and were deemed independent and 
intervening causes by the ALJ and Commission. 
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ARGUMENT III 
THERE WAS NO REASONABLE DOUBT RESPECTING 
CLAIMANT'S RIGHT TO COMPENSATION FOR THE 1982 INJURY 
Defendants do not dispute that the Workers' Compensation Act 
should be liberally construed in favor of an award of compensation 
where there is reasonable doubt. However, in this claim, there is 
no doubt that Applicant was paid full workers1 compensation 
benefits after the 1982 industrial injury. Applicant has already 
received all medical expenses and disability benefits from the 
original injury at R.P. Scherer in 1982. Claimant was not 
medically stable until 1986. Thus, Defendants paid medical 
expenses and compensation until four years after the compensable 
injury. Presumably, any doubt for full workers' compensation 
benefits was resolved in Applicant's favor from 1982 through 1987. 
Defendants do not agree that Applicant is entitled to a 
liberal construction of any doubt in his favor where he attempts to 
reopen his original claim to recover additional compensation for a 
nonindustrial injury six years later. In the McKeanf I.H.C.r and 
Perchelli decisions and in § 13 of Professor Larson's treatise, 
there is no mention of a rule of construction which requires any 
doubt to be construed in favor, of a finding that a subsequent 
nonindustrial injury was the direct and natural result of the 
original industrial injury. Claimant seeks to use a well-settled 
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rule of construction as a subterfuge to overlook the undisputed 
evidence that moving heavy objects caused the 1988 injuries. 
The rule of construction requires reasonable and material 
doubt respecting Applicant's right to compensation. Claimant 
asserts doubts based on speculation and inadmissible evidence. For 
example, Applicant's counsel refers to tests of the exertion needed 
to move a parking barrier performed in his office parking lot after 
the filing of this appeal. Additionally, Claimant cites to "Post-
It Notes'* in the record on appeal that allegedly support improper 
influence, bias, or prejudice of an unidentified ALJ. The Post-It 
Notes are inadmissible on appeal, since they were not admitted at 
the hearing, were not authenticated, lack foundation and constitute 
hearsay. Finally, Applicant speculates that Dr. MacArthur agreed 
with the opinion of the Division of Health Care Financing that the 
1988 injuries were secondary to the 1982 injury. There is no 
evidence to support this allegation and Dr. MacArthur's opinion is 
nothing but rank supposition. 
CONCLUSION 
Applicant's uncommon and extraordinary activities break the 
chain of causation between the original compensable industrial 
injury in 1982 and the nonindustrial injuries in 1988. Applicant 
failed to show that the 1988 injuries were a direct and natural 
consequence of the primary injury in 1982. All three physicians 
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agreed in the medical records that the 1988 injuries were caused by 
independent, nonindustrial lifting of boxes and concrete barriers. 
No doctor stated that Applicant's bulging disc naturally progressed 
into a herniated disc. Claimant was largely pain-free for a number 
of years before the 1988 lifting accidents, the original injury was 
six years before the nonindustrial accident, there was no 
herniation until the strenuous exertion during 1988, and Applicant 
sought emergency medical care the day after moving a concrete 
barrier. The ALJ and Commission found that Applicant's activities 
were unusual and extraordinary to distinguish mere medical 
complications of an original injury that arise during normal, day-
to-day activities such as sneezing or lifting a four month-old 
baby. 
Finally, all doubts respecting Claimant's rights to full 
compensation for the 1982 injury were resolved in his favor. There 
may be doubts concerning Claimant's right to recover under the 
direct and natural results rule for the nonindustrial accident six 
years later, but they are not reasonable and are based on 
speculation and inadmissible evidence. 
Therefore, Defendants request that the Applicant's appeal be 
dismissed and the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order 
of the ALJ and Commission be affirmed. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this i£ day of February, 1995 
J. V^hgus ^ Edwards 
PURSER & EDWARDS, L.L.C. 
39 Market Street, Third Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2104 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this |G? day of February, 1995, I 
caused two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
RESPONDENTS, to be deposited in the U.S. mails, postage prepaid, 
addressed to the following: 
Jay A. Meservy 
1610 South Main, Suite E 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
Legal Division 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
P.O. Box 146600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6600 
5004537.jae 
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